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His prior counsel having died during the pendency of the 
appeal, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, Defendant and Appellant, by and 
through his newly appointed attorney, A.W. Lauritzen and pursuant 
to Rule 35 of the Utah rules of Appellate Procedure, respectfully 
submits this petition for rehearing• 
The granting of this petition seems compelling in light of the 
following points: 
Point 1. The Court overlooked or misapprehended the impact of 
inherent conflicts created by the issue of Defendant's Counsel's 
own ineffective assistance as trial counsel• 
Point 2. The Court overlooked or misapprehended the impact of 
inherent conflicts created by appointed trial counsel raising and 
arguing in a motion for a new trial the issue as to his own 
ineffective assistance in his former capacity as trial counsel. 
Point 3. The Court overlooked appointed appellate Counsel's 
failure to follow the proper procedures and guidelines in 
submitting a purported Anders brief. 
Point 4. In the event of collateral attack, the reviewing 
court may well consider itself bound by or at least give deference 
to the findings inherently necessary to support this court's 
opinion. 
Point 5. The opinion of this court remanding this matter to 
the trial court for a new hearing on Defendant's motion for a new 
trial, as it now stands, suggests that the scope of Defendant's 
motion is limited to the issues and arguments raised by prior 
counsel. 
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DISCUSSION OF POINT 1 
Point 1, The Court overlooked the inherent conflict created 
by appointed appellate counsel raising and arguing on direct appeal 
the issue as to his own ineffective assistance as trial counsel. 
Appointed appellate counsel, Quinn D. Hunsaker, raised and 
argued on appeal, both in Point I and Point III of the Brief of 
Appellant, pages 19-29, 39-43 that the Defendant/Appellant was 
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance 
of trial counsel. The State's Brief at page 27 correctly notes 
that appellate counsel was also trial counsel in this case. 
This Court in State v. Humphries, 818 P2d 1027 (Utah 1991) 
held that the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
should be raised on appeal if the trial record is adequate to 
permit decision of the issue and if the Defendant is represented by 
counsel other than trial counsel. 
This Court in Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990) citing 
Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989) stated as follows: 
The Court reasoned that counsel who represented the 
petitioner both at trial and on appeal could not 
effectively present an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim on appeal when that argument would necessarily have 
challenged his own performance at trial and on appeal. 
The California Court of Appeals in People v. Bailey, 12 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 339 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1992) held that there is an 
inherent conflict when trial council is ultimately appointed to act 
as counsel on appeal; the California court noted that counsel is in 
the discomfiting and untenable position of urging his own 
incompetency. 
Other Courts have espoused similar views. In State v. Suarez, 
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670 p2d 1192, 1204 (Ariz. App. 1983) the Arizona Court of Appeals 
observed: 
However, if this issue is presented on appeal, it is 
improper for appellate counsel to argue his own 
ineffectiveness at trial because, as a matter of policy, 
it is difficult for counsel to objectively review his own 
performance and zealously argue any inadequacies in that 
performance on behalf of his client. In addition, one 
can easily perceive the potential for abuse if appellate 
counsel is permitted to raise, evaluate and advocate his 
effectiveness as trial counsel. If counsel honestly 
believes he was ineffective at trial or that such issue 
exists, he should so advise his client, seek leave to 
withdraw and have new counsel appointed to raise the 
issue on appeal, or pursue the matter under Rule 32, 
Arizona R. Crim. P. 
A cursory reading of the analysis of Defendant's counsel 
reveals his inability to deal with this self depreciation. Worse 
yet, what of an inadequate counsel who truly believes he has done 
well. Does Counsel appear to excuse lapses in his representation 
at trial by blaming factors beyond his control. 
The Ohio Court of Appeals in State v. Fuller, 581 N.E.2d 614, 
618 (Ohio App.2d Dist. 1990) held that appointed appellate counsel 
is presumed incapable of making an effective argument as to his own 
ineffectiveness as trial counsel and went on to say that: 
Where, as here, an indigent criminal defendant decides to 
argue on appeal that he has been deprived of the 
effective assistance of trial counsel, and has made a 
request to the trial counsel, and has made a request to 
the trial court that a lawyer, other than his trial 
counsel, be appointed to represent him on appeal, we 
conclude, based upon Penson v. Ohiof 488 U.S. 75 (1988) 
that it is a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel to fail to provide him with an attorney other 
than trial counsel to represent him in connection with 
his appeal. Furthermore, based upon Pension v. Ohio, 
supra, we conclude that such failure must be deemed to be 
prejudicial per se. 
The trial court record in the instant case clearly shows that 
3 
the defendant/appellant requested the appointment of different 
counsel to represent him on appeal. Trial counsel, Quinn D. 
Hunsaker, filed a Motion and Affidavit with the trial court on June 
28, 1990. (R. 377-388). Paragraph two of said Motion and 
Affidavit states as follows: 
2. That Mr. Cabututan has requested that I withdraw from 
his case and that the Court appoint another attorney so 
as to represent him in this matter. 
The trial court pursuant to said Motion issued an Order 
setting the matter for a hearing to be held on July 11, 1990. 
(R.378). Another Order was issued, providing for the 
transportation of Defendant from the Utah State Prison to the Court 
for the scheduled hearing. (R. 379). 
The record further reflects that Defendant filed a pro se 
affidavit, dated June 22, 1990 requesting the withdrawal of Mr. 
Hunsaker as counsel. (R. 382). 
The record at page 381 shows a Minute Entry which states as 
follows: 
The Defendant is present and represented by counsel. 
Counsel for the State is also present as listed above. 
The Defendant makes a request to represent himself on his 
appeal to the Supreme Court, and requests that attorney 
Hunsaker be dismissed as his counsel. The Court finds 
and accepts request and allows the Defendant to represent 
himself on said appeal. Attorney Hunsaker is to remain 
counsel until he turns over any and all documents and 
information which will assist the Defendant. Attorney 
for the Defendant is to prepare the proper order for this 
hearing. 
The record in this case fails to reflect any proposed Order 
prepared by appellate counsel in conformance with the Minute Entry 
and in conformance with rulings made on July 11, 1990. The record 
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further fails to reflect any Order signed by the trial judge 
requiring the withdrawal of attorney Hunsaker. Attorney Hunsaker 
remained on the case which, to all appearances, amounted to a 
refusal on his part to withdraw. It is also evident in his request 
for the transcript of proceedings (R. 386-387) that attorney 
Hunsaker also failed to include a request for a transcript of the 
proceedings held in the trial court on July 11, 1990. 
Interestingly, the record fails to reveal any admonitions by the 
court or counsel as to the perils of per se representation nor did 
the court offer Defendant independent or additional counsel. Of 
further interest, counsel did not assign error to the trial court 
for failure to act nor did he urge his inadequacy in failing to 
press the issue.. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Johnson, 823 P2d 484, 
487-488 (Utah App. 1991) held that Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
guarantees all criminal Defendants the right to effective 
assistance of counsel, Templin, (infra) at 186, and "includes the 
right [of Defendant] to counsel free from conflicts of interest". 
The court Id at 489 further stated as follows: 
Counsel's conduct may be examined in light of prevailing 
professional and ethical standards to determine whether 
Defendant received effective representation. Zepp, 748 
F2d 135. 
Rule 1.7(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
states: 
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited 
by... the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) The lawyer 
reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected; and (2) Each client consents after 
consultation. 
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There was not only a conflict of interest in Mr. Hunsaker 
raising and arguing his own ineffectiveness as trial counsel, but 
his refusal, neglect or failure to withdraw deprived the Defendant 
of his right to represent himself on appeal, State v. Penderville, 
272 P2d 195 (Utah 1954) or the opportunity to seek substitute 
appointed counsel. State v. Zackuse, 833 P2d 142 (Mont. 1991); 
State v. Browning, 824 P2d 170 (Idaho App. 1992). 
Furthermore, referring to documents in the Addendum, it is 
clear that during the pendency of this appeal, there was litigation 
pending between the Defendant and attorney Hunsaker in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah; said litigation 
actively persisting from February of 1992 to date. 
Mr. Hunsaker's refusal or failure to withdraw as counsel 
because of this conflict of interest raises the inference that 
substitute counsel may have been precluded from requesting the 
Court for leave to file a substitute Brief of Appellant in lieu of 
the brief filed by Mr. Hunsaker. Furthermore, it may be inferred 
that Defendant has been prejudiced by Mr. Hunsaker's representation 
of him during oral arguments or by the waiver thereof by counsel. 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the per se rule 
announced in State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1992) which 
addresses the similar problem of the part time role of defense 
counsel as prosecutor should also apply to attorneys claiming and 
arguing on appeal or in post conviction proceeding their own 
ineffective assistance as trial counsel. 
Mr. Hunsaker's performance as appellate counsel was further 
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deficient because of his failure to correct the inadequacies in the 
transcripts of the trial court proceedings as provided under Rule 
11(g) and Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
State v. Menzies, P. 2d , (Utah 1992) State v. Taylor, 
664 P.2d, 439 (Utah 1983). Page 6 of the trial transcript shows 
that the jury was selected, following which the court recessed for 
lunch. There is no transcript relating to the jury selection 
process filed in this case. The trial court issued an Order for a 
full transcript of the trial proceedings at the expense of Box 
Elder County. (R.387). Mr. Hunsaker's performance was deficient 
in his failure to correct the inadequacies in the trial transcript 
which was devoid of the jury selection process. The lack of such 
transcript raises questions as to whether there were any errors, 
irregularities, or improprieties in the selection of the jury which 
would constitute reversible error, particularly in light of 
Defendant's reservations (Defendant's affidavit in support of 
motion for new trial) (Tr. 23 March 1990, p. 10-11). 
There are other inadequacies in the transcript of the trial 
proceedings. On page 3 53 of the trial transcript the Court stated: 
"The Court will note for the record that all previous motions made 
by the defendant in previous hearings and at the beginning of this 
trial (emphasis mine) are perpetuated." Again, Mr. Hunsaker failed 
to correct the inadequacies of the trial transcript which is 
totally devoid of any proceedings relating to motions raised by the 
defendant at the beginning of the trial. Notwithstanding the 
court's statement, all in all, it is apparent that no transcripts 
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of Defendant's motion was presented in connection with Appellant's 
brief. Mr. Hunsaker's deficient performance as counsel deprived 
the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the Effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. 
This case presents unique circumstances where the record is 
clear as to the conflict of interest between the defendant and his 
appointed attorney on appeal. Such conflict deprived the defendant 
of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel 
on appeal. The defendant therefore submits that the written 
Opinion of this Court affirming part of his conviction should be 
withdrawn and vacated. State v. Elton, 680 P. 2d 727-728 (Utah 
1984). This withdrawal would be ordered on the basis that 
defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal, the defendant submits 
that a new Opinion then should be issued reversing the judgment of 
the trial court and remanding the case to the trial court with 
instructions to enter a new appealable judgment. Stahl v. 
Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 617 (Kentucky 1981); Rodriguez v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969). 
DISCUSSION OP POINT 2 
2. The Court overlooked the inherent conflicts created by 
appointed trial counsel raising and arguing, in a motion for a new 
trial, the issue as to his own ineffective assistance as trial 
counsel. 
This Court in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) held 
that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can 
properly be raised in a motion for a new trial. See also, 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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Defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial with a 
supporting affidavit of Raymond Phillip Cabututan in the trial 
court. (R. 348-356) . Inter aliaf the defendant claimed that he was 
entitled to a new trial because he was deprived of his Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel. 
The defendant claimed under paragraph number six of his 
affidavit that his attorney, Mr. Hunsaker, did not adequately 
cross-examine prosecution witnesses. (R. 353). This claim, if 
established by competent argument, could constitute a denial of the 
effective assistance of counsel. People v. Skinner, 581 N.E.2d 252 
(111. App. 1 Dist. 1991). 
The defendant claimed under paragraph number seven of his 
affidavit that his attorney, Mr. Hunsaker did not adequately 
prepare for his case. (R. 353). This claim, if established 
by competent argument, could constitute a denial of the effective 
assistance of counsel. State v. Templin, (supra). 
The defendant claimed under paragraph number ten of his 
affidavit that his attorney, Mr. Hunsaker did not adequately cross-
examine Richard Anderson and failed to place crucial evidence into 
the trial record. This claim if established could constitute a 
denial of the effective assistance of Counsel. People v. Skinner, 
581 N.E.2d 252 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1991); Fernandez v. Cook, 783 
P.2d 547 (Utah 1989). 
There are other issues such as Mr. Hunsaker's failure to 
timely file a Motion for the Court to appoint a Psychiatrist, This 
claim, if established by competent arugument, could constitute a 
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denial of the effective assistance of counsel. United States v. 
Gholston, 932 F.2d 904, 905 (11th Cir. 1991). 
The attorney who presented and argued the defendant's claim of 
the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the motion for a new 
trial was Quinn Hunsaker who was placed in the unenviable position 
of claiming and arguing his own ineffective assistance as trial 
counsel. 
Defendant contends that the same standards which prevent 
counsel from claiming or arguing on direct appeal or in post-
conviction relief, his own ineffective assistance as trial counsel, 
should also be applied in motions for a new trial. 
The conflict of interest between the defendant and his trial 
attorney deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel in his motion for a new trial and 
at the hearing held on the motion for a new trial. Such conflict 
may account for the deficient performance of Mr. Hunsaker in 
advancing such claim at the hearing held on said motion for a new 
trial on March 23, 1990. (March 23, 1990 Hearing Tr. 3-19). As 
briefed, argued and presented, the motion for a new trial ignored 
the real factual and legal basis for ineffective assistance that 
was contended by the Defendant. The Defendant was, as a matter of 
law and as a matter of fact, deprived of his Sixth Amendment right 
to the effective assistance of counsel in the presentation of 
defendant's motion for a new trial. The Court can presume the 
deprivation to be based in the conflict visited on Defendant's 
counsel. 
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DISCUSSION OF POINT 3 
3. The Court overlooked appellate counsel's failure to comply 
with the guidelines and requirements in submitting a purported 
Anders brief. 
Mr. Hunsaker, in submitting what purports to be an Anders 
brief (Appellant's brief p. 45) , failed to comply with the 
requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) in that 
he failed to advise the Court that he believed the appeal to be 
wholly frivolous and to request that he be permitted to withdraw 
from the case. State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (1981); State v. 
Flores, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 48-49 (Utah App. 1993). 
Mr. Hunsaker under Point V of the Argument, (Brief of 
Appellant, page 45) states that counsel submits the argument, 
pursuant to Defendant's wishes, and under the Rules pursuant to 
Anders v. California, supra, that Defendant was denied a fair trial 
due to biased opinions against him based upon his race. 
There are other indications that the Brief submitted by Mr. 
Hunsaker was an Anders brief • This can best be demonstrated by the 
text of the Brief of Appellee. 
At page 13 of the Brief of Appellee, counsel states that 
Defendant alleges, without providing legal analysis or authority, 
that the trial court abused its discretion in not permitting the 
jury to view the crime scene. 
At page 15 of the Brief of Appellee, counsel states that on 
appeal, defendant does not demonstrate why the court's decision 
prejudiced him, but concludes, without record citation or support, 
that eyewitness identification was inadequate and testimony 
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inconsistent. 
At page 16 of the Brief of Appellee, Counsel states that 
because defendant has not supported his argument with citation or 
legal analysis and because it is not supported by the record these 
contentions should be rejected. 
At page 23 of the Brief of Appellee, Counsel states that 
regarding the issue of prosecutorial misconduct Defendant has both 
failed to properly preserve and to substantively argue his 
allegations, and his claims should be rejected. 
At pages 23-24 of the Brief of Appellee, counsel states that 
Defendant has failed throughout to offer any evidence supporting 
his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and has not properly 
preserved the issue for appellate review. 
It would appear from these numerous statements and comments in 
the Brief of Appellee that the Brief of Appellant lacked any 
substantive argument; lacked any legal analysis; lacked any factual 
arguments; and lacked any citations to the record and evidence to 
support any argument. These arguments of Appellee appear to have 
considerable merit. 
These contentions and a review of the Brief of Appellant 
suggests that the brief, in that it was submitted as an Anders 
brief, must comply with this Court's requirements in State v. 
Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). This case held that an Anders 
brief in Utah must contain a Statement of Facts and Argument 
containing any issues with supporting authority. Appellants prior 
counsel, Mr. Hunsaker, therefore, failed to comply with that 
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requirement in that he failed to advise the Court that he believed 
the appeal was wholly frivolous, he move the Court to permit his 
withdrawal from the case, nor did he demontrate to the Court that 
the appeal is frivolous. 
DISCUSSION OF POINT 4 
Point 4. It is vital to a fair consideration of Defendant's 
subsequent judicial proceedings that these errors be corrected by 
this Court. If they are not, the issues raised on appeal could be 
subsequently barred by res judicata, State v. Wareham, 801 P2d 
(Utah 1990); Candelario v. Cook, 789 P2d 710 (Utah 1990); and the 
Federal Courts will give deference to this Court's finding, if they 
are the findings of a majority of the Court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 
U.S. 539 (1981). 
DISCUSSION OF POINT 5 
In the hearing held in Box Elder County on 11 June 1993, upon 
remand from this court, the presiding judge read the opinion as 
limiting Defendant to the issues pressed in his original motion for 
a new trial (transcript pending) and indeed seemed to limit new 
counsel to the arguments advanced by Defendant's prior counsel. 
Defendant contends that new counsel should not, by this court's 
opinion, if it so holds, be fettered by the bounds of prior 
counsels ingenuity or industry. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the Opinion issued by 
the Court affirming part of his conviction should be withdrawn and 
vacated. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
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the case remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a 
new appealable judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 1993. 
A. 
Attorney fo 
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CERTIFICATE OP COUNSEL 
Counsel certifies that this petition is submitted in good 
faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, postage prepaid, to the 
following listed below on this \^ —day of July, 1993. 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
Judith S.H. Atherton 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
A D D E N D U M 
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Quinn D. Hunsaker #4058 
Attorney at Law 
102 South First West 
P.O. Box 461 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
(801) 723-8569 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
CIVIL NO. 891000060FS 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, by and 
through his attorney, Quinn D. Hunsaker, pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and hereby makes his Motion for a New 
Trial to be held in the above-captioned matter. 
FACTS 
1. On January 3, 1990, the Defendant with h is a t t o rney 
appeared before the F i r s t Judicial Dis t r i c t Court, Honorable F. L. 
Gunnell p r e s i d i n g . At tha t t ime, the newly promulgated court 
ru les of the Firs t - Judicial Dis t r ic t were in effect , and 
Defendant's counsel expected to follow that procedure. However, 
the Court did not al low for discovery time or a p r e - t r i a l 
conference between the Defendant and the County Attorney's off ice, 
bu t s e t the mat ter for t r i a l to begin on January 22, 1990. 
Counsel objected, however, the Court indicated tha t t r i a l would 
MAR 2 1990 
proceed at that time. 
2. That on or about January 18, 1990, counsel appeared 
before the Court to argue several motions, including a Motion for 
Continuance. The Motion for Continuance was denied although 
counsel indicated further time was necessary to prepare for the 
trial. 
3. That prior to trial, counsel determined that it was 
necessary to have an alcohol expert testify both to the level of 
alcohol that the Defendant had, and to the effects of alcohol upon 
the Defendant i.e. whether or not the Defendant had the necessary 
state of mind to form the intent required to be guilty of Second 
Degree Murder. 
4. That prior to the trial, Defendant's counsel discussed 
with Defendant the need for further discovery, as well as the 
necessity of the other Defendants being called to testify in the 
matter. 
5. That on January 22, 1990, trial of the above-entitled 
matter commenced, with the Defendant preserving his earlier Motion 
for Continuance with the Court and with other motions made 
previously. 
6. That at the trial, counsel for the Defendant attempted to 
call as witnesses the three co-defendants in this matter, but the 
Court refused to have them called as witnesses in this matter. 
7. That at the trial, during the selection of the jury, the 
Defendant noted that he felt that certain racial remarks were made 
against him by perspective jury members, as well as the jury panel 
not being representative of his peers i.e., no minorities were 
placed on the jury. 
8. That during the trial, the Defendant testified to his 
intoxication, but the Court would not allow expert testimony to 
base an opinion upon the level that the Defendant was at during 
the incident that occurred. 
9. That the jury was kept in a small room, throughout the 
entire day on Friday, until the jury instructions were completed. 
The jury was not supervised at that time, and Defendant is 
informed and believes that the jury discussed the case and made 
its decision prior to being instructed by the Court regarding the 
law. 
10. That the jury found the Defendant guilty of Second 
Degree Murder, guilty of Aggravated Assault and guilty of a Class 
B Misdemeanor, threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a 
fight or quarrel. 
11. That at the trial, the weapon claimed to have been used 
in the Aggravated Assault was not produced, thus depriving the 
jury of noting whether or not it was truly a dangerous weapon. 
12. That at the trial, counsel attempted to use the private 
investigator to demonstrate the inability of witnesses to use 
certain aspects of the incident that they claimed to have 
perceived, but said private investigator was unable to convey such 
detail. Previously, the Court, without noting any of the evidence 
or testimony, specifically ruled out having the jury view the 
crime scene. 
13. Subsequent to Defendant's trial, each of the three 
co-defendants testified"at trial, which testimony the Defendant is 
informed and believes is exculpatory to the Defendant, and 
Defendant attempted but could not procure their testimony or 
presence at his first trial. 
14. That at Defendant's trial, and its subsequent trials, a 
eye witness, Richard Anderson, testified and contradicted himself 
on key points testimony, but the prosecuting attorney allowed such 
testimony that the Defendant is informed and believes is perjury 
but was allowed both by the Court and by the County Attorney. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24 allows for a new 
trial in the interest of justice. 
The basis for a new trial in this matter is multi-f auceted, 
and is allowable by the Court. In this matter, the Defendant 
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was deprived of the testimony of three eye witnesses, i.e., the 
three co-defendants, which testimony the Defendant believes is 
exculpatory to him. 
Additionally, the Defendant believes the Court was arbritrary 
and capricious in denying the motion for the jury to view the 
crime scene; to disallow testimony by the alcohol expert; to 
disallow the retaining of an expert psychiatrist to testify 
regarding the Defendant's inability to form the specific intent 
required under a second degree murder charge; to disallow a 
continuance; to require the jury to sit unsupervised all 
throughout Friday, thus allowing, as the Defendant is informed and 
believes, for the jury to make their decision prior to the Court 
rendering to the jury the jury instructions. 
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore, 
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court grant the Defendant 
a new trial in the above-entitled matter. 
Dated this ^ ^ — ' day of March, 1990 
pjM, h^\j 
Jnn W.' Hunsaker 
Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to: Mr. Roger F. Baron, Deputy Box Elder 
Attorney, 45 North 100 East, Brigham City, Utatj/84302. 
Dated this day of March, 1990. 
Quinn D. Hunsaker #4058 
Attorney at Law 
102 South First West 
P.O. Box 461 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
( 8 0 1 ) 7 2 3 - 8 5 6 9 
BRIGHAM DISTRICT 
Has 2 3 H3 PH 'SO 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN, 
Defendant• 
AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND PHILLIP 
CABUTUTAN 
CIVIL NO. 891000060FS 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
) 
: ss . 
I, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, being first duly sworn depose 
and say: 
1. That I am the Defendant in the above-entitled matter, and 
do hereby make and publish this Affidavit in support of any motion 
for new trial or appeal that my attorney may present. 
2. That it is my firm and just belief that I did not receive 
a fair trial in the First Judicial District Court, and that I am 
entitled to a new trial. 
3 . That I do not believe I received a fair trial due to the 
fact that the Court allowed less than thirty (30) days preparation 
for trial, and the Court would not grant any continuance as 
requested by myself or my attorney on my behalf* 
4. That I believe that the jury was biased because I am a 
minority, and because they claimed I am a transient. I pointed 
MAR 2 1990 
out to my attorney that there were no minorities on the jury, but 
my attorney did not object as I asked him to so as to allow other 
minorities to be placed on the jury panel. 
5. That it is my firm belief that there was way too much 
publicity as all of the jury panel was aware of the false 
accusations against me, which I believe made them biased against 
me and did not allow for a fair trial solely upon the facts 
presented at trial. 
6. I believe that I was denied effective assistance of 
counsel due to the fact that the Court did not allow a continuance 
as requested by my attorney, and further that my attorney did not 
cross-examine witnesses in the way in which I asked. I 
specifically asked my attorney to cross-examine each of the 
witnesses on each particular point that they had contradicted 
themselves on in earlier testimony, but my attorney did not do as 
I requested. 
7. I do not believe I received a fair trial and effective 
assistance of counsel due to the fact that my attorney did not 
properly prepare my case. It is my belief that he left out vital 
evidence that would have proved my innocence, including statements 
made by myself on the day after my arrest in regards to self 
defense claims and other particular points of my defense. 
8. That on January 22, 1990, the day my trial commenced, my 
attorney told me he was not properly prepared for a case such as 
this, and I believe that denied me effective assistance of 
counsel. 
9 . I believe I was denied a fair trial in that one of the 
witnesses, Richard Anderson, clearly perjured himself by first 
stating that he had not left the trailer, but later indicating 
that he had left the trailer once Eric Tilley had testified that 
Richard Anderson's statement was false. I further believe that 
there was misconduct by the fact that Richard Anderson was told of 
Eric Tilley's testimony outside of the courtroom by Detective Dale 
Ward, another witness, which clearly violated the Exclusionary 
Rule placed upon all witnesses at my trial. 
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10. My attorney told me that the State's offices had warned 
Richard Anderson that Eric Tilley had testified that Richard 
Anderson's statement about leaving the trailer was false, but I do 
not believe that my attorney entered that in the court record or 
properly cross-examined Richard Anderson on that matter, thereby 
denying me effective assistance of counsel. 
11. I believe that the Prosecuting Attorney knew of the 
conflicting statements and false accusations of Richard Anderson, 
but allowed such perjury to enter the case without properly 
protecting my rights to a fair trial, and his duty to make sure 
that no perjury was entered in my case. 
12. I believe that I am entitled to a new trial due to the 
testimony presented by the three other co-defendants, William 
Cummins, Don Brown and Billy Cayer, which testimony clearly 
supported my continued claims of self-defense. 
13. I believe that the Court errored in allowing the jury to 
sit all day on Friday in a small room, thereby deciding my case 
before the jury was properly instructed by the Court. 
14. I specifically requested that my attorney force the 
Court to make some issue of the failure of Sherman Galardo to be 
present at trial, but the Court denied any such information to the 
jury which I believe would have helped influence their decision. 
15. I believe I did not receive a fair trial due to the fact 
that the Court refused to allow the jury to view the scene, which 
would have effectively showed that Richard Anderson could not have 
seen what he claimed he saw, as well as giving them an idea of how 
small the trailers actually were which was not effectively done 
either by testimony or pictures. I believe that the Judge was 
prejudiced against me by the reason that he denied the Motion for 
the jury to view the scene even before testimony had been heard, 
showing that he did not care whether or not I received a fair 
trial. 
16. Additionally, I specifically requested to my attorney 
and Private Investigator that pictures be taken during right 
conditions at the camp so that the jury would be able to know that 
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Richard Anderson and the other witnesses could not see what they 
claimed they saw due to the limited visibility at the camp during 
the night, which was that no one could see hardly anything unless 
it was directly in the light. Because this was not done, I 
believe I was denied effective assistance of counsel, and further, 
that the Judge erred in not letting the jury go to the scene at 
the camp, 
17. I believe I did not receive a fair trial when the Court 
referred to allow either alcohol testimony or allowing my attorney 
to retain a psychiatrist to be able to testify on whether or not I 
had the specific intent to endanger the life of Miquel Rameriz due 
to my consumption of alcohol. 
18. I believe that I was denied a fair trial when the State 
failed to produce the sharpening stone which was claimed to be 
part of the aggravated assault on Eric Apodaca. Because this was 
not produced, the jury did not know if the stone really was a 
dangerous weapon or not, and the stone should have been at trial. 
I hereby request that the Court grant a new trial based upon 
the above-stated reasons. 
Dated this cP<^ ~ day of February, 1990. 
Raymond Phillip Cabututan 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this £<r "~~ day of 
February, 1990 
£2ZL 
Nota ry P u b l i c 
R e s i d i n g a t : f£&fffff??/V*lf (Jn+rf 
My Commission E x p i r e s : £&/9T /£, '9*?/ 
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Quinn D. Hunsaker #4058 
Attorney at Law 
102 South First West 
P.O. Box 461 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
(801) 723-8569 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ) MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT OF 
QUINN D. HUNSAKER 
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN, ) 
D e f e n d a n t . ) 
CIVIL NO. _&9£0OfrStJFS-
]
 ^icoooko 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER ) 
I, Quinn D. Hunsaker, being first duly sworn depose and say: 
1. That I am the court appointed attorney for Raymond 
Phillip Cabututan in the above-entitled matter, and if called as a 
witness, can testify competently thereto, 
2. That Mr. Cabututan has requested that I withdraw from his 
case and that the Court appoint another attorney so as to 
represent him in this matter, 
3. That I know of no conflict that exists other than the 
fact that the Defendant feels that his interests would be better 
represented by other counsel on appeal, and therefore under the 
circumstances I believe that I am no longer able to effectively 
represent Mr. Cabututan and therefore Mr. Cabututan should be 
represented by other counsel in this matter. Case »\'o. 
JM 2 9 1990 ^ 
BMGHAU01STRIU 
WHEREFORE, counsel respectively requests the Court set a time 
and date in the above-entitled matter, and that the Defendant, 
Raymond Phillip Cabututan, and at such hearing be appointed other 
counsel to represent him on appeal on this matter. 
DATED this 1$&* day of June, 1908^ S \ 
Quihn D. Hunsaker 
Attorney at Law 
i 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, Raymond Phillip 
Cabututan, shall appear before the above-entitled Court on the 
11th day of July, 1990, at the hour of 1:30 p.m., and there 
present to the Court his Motion for appointment of counsel for 
representation on appeal. 
DATED this 2\ °l day of June, 1990. 
4*t*t~**r^ *JL£_ 
L. Gunnell 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to: Raymond Phillip Cabututan, 14000 South 
Frontage Road, Draper, Utah 84020; Mr. Roger F. Baron, Deputy Box 
Elder Attorney, 45 North 100 East, Brigham City, Utah 84302; Paul 
Van Dam, Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Bldg., Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Dated t h i s , ^ day of 'U'.?-/ ^ 1990. 
3M retary 
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BWGHMt DISTRICT 
RT, IN AND FOR IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
Raymond Phillip Cabututan 
Defendant. 
REQUEST AND ORDER OF 
TRANSPORTATION 
Criminal No. A9-U3^ W^ >F-S-
YllCOdOhO 
COMES NOW, Quinn D. Hunsaker, attorney for the Defendant, 
Raymond Phillip Cabututan, and hereby requests an Order for the 
Transportation of the Defendant from the Utah State Prison to the 
above-entitled Court for the matter set on the 11th day of July, 
1990 at 1:30 p.m. 
DATED this ffi day of *\ UJ^j^ , 1990. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
ORDER 
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named Defendant shall be 
transported by you from the Utah State Prison to the 
above-entitled Court at the hearing set on the 11th day of July, 
1990 at 1:30 p.m. 
DATED this c?^ 7 day of ,M ji^Zj 1990. 
District Judge 
JUN 2 9 1990 " 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
CABUTUTAN, RAYMOND PHILLIP 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 891000060 FS 
DATE 07/11/90 
HONORABLE F. L. GUNNELL 
COURT REPORTER FELSHAW, RODNEY 
COURT CLERK SLH 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. BUNDERSON, JON J 
D. ATTY. HUNSAKER, QUINN D 
THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. COUNSEL FOR 
THE STATE IS ALSO PRESENT AS LISTED ABOVE. THE DEFENDANT MAKES 
A REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF ON HIS APPEAL TO THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND REQUESTS THAT ATTORNEY HUNSAKER BE DISMISSED AS HIS 
COUNSEL. THE COURT FINDS AND ACCEPTS REQUEST AND ALLOWS THE 
DEFENDANT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF ON SAID APPEAL. ATTORNEY HUNSAKER 
IS TO REMAIN COUNSEL UNTIL HE TURNS OVER ANY AND ALL DOCUMENTS 
AND INFORMATION WHICH WILL ASSIST THE DEFENDANT. ATTORNEY FOR 
THE DEFENDANT IS TO PREPARE THE PROPER ORDER FOR THIS HEARING. 
I RAYMOND rnlLLH- CAflUTUTnw 
rfould put in a motion for relief of counsul 
In the First Dmaicia;. Court 
in ana for Box Llder County Sate of Utha 
On the facts of 
Misrepresentation 
Conflict of enterest 
*nd Insaificent Counsul 
And woula ask that all eviaance
 f Transcripts of hearings 
and trials of mine and the*i*£rdefendants be turned over 
to ne 
So I may fight my ov<n case 
Rut i would also reserve the right to obtian counsul 
My attorney is Quin Hunsaker #^C58 
Attorney at law 102 South First Vrfest 
P.O Box ^61 
3righan uity Utah 6^302 
Case No.^LC^£^/ 
JUL 1 > 1990 
BRIGHAU DISTRJC" 
Quinn D. Hunsaker #4058 
Attorney at Law 
102 South First West 
P.O. Box 461 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
(801) 723-8569 
QcrlS IQ 55 AiJ f90 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN, 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTS 
OF PROCEEDINGS 
CIVIL NO- 891000060FS 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, by and 
thorough his attorney, Quinn D. Hunsaker, and hereby request that 
the transcript of the trial of State of Utah vs. Raymond Phillip 
Cabututan, held on January 22, 1990 through January 26, 1990, held 
in the above-entitled Court be prepared and submitted to the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah as part of the Defendant's 
appeal of the judgment and conviction after trial. Said 
transcript is to be prepared at the expense of Box Elder County 
pursuant to previous evidence submitted to the Court as to the 
Defendant being impecunious. 
DATED this// £*L day of , 1990. 
Quihn D. Hunsaker 
Attorney at Law 
lOt South 100 West 
P. 0. Box 461 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Case No.22&2222££ 
OCT ) 6 1991 * , 
ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT 
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing therefore, 
and the Court having previously considered the impecuniousity of 
the Defendant, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the transcript of the trial of 
State of Utah vs. Raymond Phillip Cabututan as described above in 
the request made by the Defendant, shall be prepared at the 
expense of Box Elder County. 
DATED this //,- day of ±-r / / , 1990. 
F. L. Gunnell 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to: Jon J. Bunderson, Box Elder County 
Attorney, 45 North 100 East, Brigham City, Utah 84302; R. Paul 
VanDam, Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114. 
DATED this /^T^day of $CKQ&V 1990. 
inn D. Hunsaker 
torney at Law 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT QF BOX* ELDE* COUNT1 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN, 
DEFENDANT. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
) 
) 
) 
> 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 831000060 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY 
FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE F.L. GUNNELL, JUDGE, 
SITTING WITH A JURY AT BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH ON THE 32^0, 23RD. 
24TH, 25TH, AND 26TH DAYS OF JANUARY 1990. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
•*•*•* •*•* 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
ROGER F. BARON 
QUINN D. HUNSAKER 
**.*•*•* 
REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN 
347 E. 2800 N. 
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414 
WK. 451-3271 HM. 782-3148 
NOV 2 9 1990 
_100>I Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Case No \'ften& 
_\ / \tr 
u 
r,/i 
353 
1 THAT THE JURY IS PRESENT IN THE JURY BOX. THE DEFENDANT IS 
2 PRESENT AS COUNSEL. STATE'S PRESENT. THE COURT WILL NOTE FOR 
3 THE RECORD THAT ALL PREVIOUS MOTIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT IN. 
4 PREVIOUS HEARINGS AND AT JHg BEGINNING OF THIS TRIAL ARE 
5 PERPETUATED. 
6 MR. HUNSAKER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
7 THE COURT: YOU MAY PROCEED, MR. HUNSAKER. 
8 MR. HUNSAKER: WE'LL CALL THE FIRST WITNESS, JOSEPH LYNN 
9 YEATES. 
10 THE COURT: I REMIND YOU YOU'RE STILL UNDER OATH FROM 
H YOUR PREVIOUS TESTIMONY. 
12 THE WITNESS: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
13 LYNN YEATES, 
14 PREVIOUSLY CALLED AS A WITNESS, WAS AGAIN 
15 EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
16 RECRQSS-EXAMINATIQN 
17 BY MR. HUNSAKER: 
18 Q NOW, SERGEANT YEATES, IN REGARDS TO YOUR DUTIES AT THE 
19 SHERIFF'S OFFICE, IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU ARE THE 
20 EVIDENCE CUSTODIAN, IS THAT CORRECT? 
21 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
22 Q SO IN OTHER WORDS, ALL THIS STUFF THAT I PLACED OUT HERE 
23 YESTERDAY, YOU'RE THE PERSON THAT TAKES CHARGE OF THAT FROM 
24 THE TIME THAT IT'S SEIZED UNTIL WE COME TO TRIAL LIKE THIS? 
25 UNLESS IT'S TAKEN AND TESTED SOMEPLACE ELSE? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT REPRESENTED BY HIS CLIENT. AND 
THE — THAT THE STATE IS PRESENT WITH MR. ROGER BARON. EXCUSE 
ME, REPRESENTED BY MP. HUNSAKER, CORRECT? 
MR. HUNSAKER: THAT'S CORRECT. YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT; AMD THE STATE'S REPRESENTED BY MP. 
BARON. ARE YOU READY TO PROCEED, GENTLEMEN"' 
MR. BARON: STATE IS READY, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT 
YOU'RE READY AS WELL, MR. HUNSAKER, IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. HUNSAKER: UNDER THE PREVIOUS DECISION, YOUR HONOR, 
WE' RE READY TO PROCEED. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. IT'S MY 
UNDERSTANDING ALSO THAT THE CLERK HAS SWORN THE JURY PANEL, IS 
THAT ALSO CORRECT? 
THE CLERK: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: AND INSTRUCTED THEM AS TO THE PROCEDURES 
THAT WE'RE GOING TO FOLLOW AT- THIS POINT, IS THAT CORRECT? 
THE CLERK: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WOULD THE CLERK NOW DRAW THE JURY? 
(WHEREUPON THE JURY WAS SELECTED, FOLLOWING 
WHICH THE COURT RECESSED FOR LUNCH.) 
THE COURT: THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT THE DEFENDANT 
IS PRESENT AS ARE COUNSEL FOR BOTH SIDES. THERE'S BEEN A 
REQUEST MADE IN CHAMBERS FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, SO 
MAG 
U.S. District Court 
District of Utah (Central) 
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 92-CV-136 
abututan v. Hunsaker Filed: 02/12/92 
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Referred to: Judge Ronald N. Boyce 
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defendant 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
F I L . J 
United States Cot: --i of Appealr 
Tenth Circuit 
MAR 0 1 1993 
ROBERT L. HOECKER 
Clerk 
RAYMOND P. CABUTTJTAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
QUINN D. HUNSAKER, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 92-4086 
(D. Utah No. 92-CV-136) 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT1 
Before LOGAN, CircuityJudge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 
EBEL, Circuit Judge ** 
This case comes before us on the district court's 28 U.S.C. 
§1915 (d) dismissal of the appellant's civil rights claims under 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1981, 1985(3) and 1986.1 We affirm the 
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 
be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 
for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 
submitted without oral argument. 
Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, the appellant has 
filed in this court a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. He requests 
that we dismiss his claim without prejudice, representing that the 
defendant, Quinn Hunsaker, was found dead sometime between January 
14th and January 22, 1993. He seeks dismissal without prejudice 
so that he can file a subsequent complaint with his coconspirators 
in the underlying case. 
The appellant's motion is denied. In its dismissal of the 
complaint under § 1915 (d), the lower court reached the merits of 
district court's order as to the appellant's Section 1981, 1985(3) 
and 1986 claims but remand for further proceedings with respect to 
the appellant's Section 1983 claim. 
On October 26, 1989, the appellant, Raymond P. Cabututan, was 
arrested and charged with second degree murder, aggravated 
assault, and threatening or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
quarrel. The appellee, Quinn D. Hunsaker, acted as a public 
defender and represented the appellant at trial in Box Elder 
County, Utah. The appellant was convicted and is currently 
incarcerated at the Utah Central Correctional Facility in 
Gunnison, Utah. 
On February 12, 1992, the appellant filed this pro se civil 
rights action in the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah. He alleges that the appellee violated his constitutional 
2 
rights in the course of representing him at trial. The district 
the appellant's claims and therefore, as the case comes before us, 
dismissal of the complaint without prejudice is inappropriate. 
Furthermore, the case is not rendered moot by the death of the 
defendant as his estate may still be liable for any constitutional 
violations. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, we 
note for the appellant's instruction that upon remand the merits 
of his claims are reopened and the district court may at that time 
entertain a motion to dismiss without prejudice should the 
appellant choose to renew his motion there to dismiss his 
complaint. 
2 
Among the appellants claims are that the appellee failed to: 
request a venue change in light of pretrial publicity, request a 
new jury after he was informed of prejudicial remarks made by some 
jurors, impeach or object to the testimony of contradictory 
eyewitnesses, object to violations of the exclusionary rule, keep 
out perjured testimony, move for a racially balanced jury, or move 
for a new trial. In addition, the appellant claims the appellee 
was "related through marriage" to the state's attorney, 
represented some of the jurors as a private attorney, refused to 
argue self-defense as the appellant requested, and incompetently 
directed his appeal. 
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court referred the action to a magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate issued a Report and Recommendation 
on March 20, 1992, advising that the complaint should be dismissed 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The appellant subsequently filed 
objections to the magistrate's report. The district court adopted 
the magistrate's Report and Recommendation in full on April 21, 
1992. 
Under 28 U.S.C. §1915 (d), a claim is to be dismissed only if 
it is found to be "frivolous or malicious." We review the 
dismissal of an action under 28 U.S.C. §1915 (d) for an abuse of 
discretion. LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1118 (10th Cir. 
1991). "Whenever a plaintiff states an arguable claim for relief, 
dismissal for frivolousness under §1915(d) is improper, even if 
the legal basis underlying the claim is incorrect." McKinney v. 
Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991).4 
I. The Claims Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) and 1986 
The district court properly dismissed the appellant's claims 
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) and 1986. The appellant failed 
to allege any racial or class based discriminatory animus as 
28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides with respect to in forma pauperis 
proceedings that "[t]he court . . . may dismiss the case if 
satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 
4 
The appellant appears before us pro se and accordingly we 
construe his pleadings liberally. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 
(1980); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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required by §1981, General Building Contractors v. Pennsylvania, 
458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (cited in Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 
1240, 1250 (10th Cir. 1992)), and §1985(3), Griffen v. 
Breckenridae. 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).6 In addition, the 
appellant's §1986 claim was correctly dismissed because there can 
be no liability for failing to prevent a civil rights conspiracy 
under §19 86 where there is no valid claim of conspiracy under 
§1985(3). Taylor v. Nichols, 558 F.2d 561, 568 (10th Cir. 1977). 
II. The Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
The magistrate recommended, and the district court ordered, 
the dismissal of the appellant's §1983 claims because they 
concluded that "[a]n attorney acting as a public defender in a 
criminal case does not act under color of state law within the 
meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983." The magistrate cited Polk County v. 
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) and Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497 
(10th Cir. 1979). While this statement of the law is generally 
Further, as the magistrate noted, the appellee's actions that 
form the basis of the appellant's claims were not prohibited by 
§1981. Section 1981 guarantees to all citizens the equal right 
"to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, 
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens." Appellant here did not allege actions violative of 
these proscriptions. 
g 
There are only three references to race in the complaint. 
First, the appellant described himself as being of "Asian/ 
Philippeno [sic] " heritage. Second, the appellant alleges that he 
informed the appellee of racial remarks that jurors had made to 
him. Third, the appellant complains that no minorities were 
empaneled on his jury. None of these references suggest that the 
appellee acted with any racial or class-based discriminatory 
animus. 
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correct, the district court failed to note the more recent Supreme 
Court case of Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984) in which 
it was held that 
public defenders are not immune from liability in actions 
brought by a criminal defendant against state public 
defenders who are alleged to have conspired with state 
officials to deprive the §1983 plaintiff of federal 
constitutional rights. 
In the instant case, the district court failed to consider 
the appellant's claims of a conspiracy between the appellees and 
the prosecutor in determining whether the appellee was acting 
7 
under color of state law. This court has spoken to the level of 
proof necessary to establish state action by asserting a 
conspiracy between private defendants and state officials. A 
court must proceed with caution when considering the pre-trial 
dismissal of conspiracy allegations in civil rights proceedings 
because of the difficult nature of the proof involved. Fisher v. 
Shamburg. 614 F.2d 156, 162 (10th Cir. 1980). However, "mere 
conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are 
insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts 
The prosecutor is a state actor who is entitled to immunity 
for actions taken in his official capacity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976). Accordingly, if the appellant is 
determined to have alleged sufficient facts to establish a 
conspiracy between the appellee and the prosecutor, the appellee 
can be found to have acted under color of state law for purposes 
of Section 1983. See Tower, 467 U.S. at 923. 
The appellant, in order "to show discrimination and 
conspiracy in the action," alleged that the prosecutor and the 
appellee: (1) were related through marriage; (2) had or were 
representing members of the jury in unrelated legal matters; (3) 
knew of and allowed perjured testimony to be admitted at trial; 
(4) knew of and failed to object to violations of the exclusionary 
rule; and (5) knew of the pretrial publicity but failed to move 
for a change of venue. 
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tending to show agreement and concerted action." Sooner Products 
Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1983). "The standard 
is even stricter where the state officials involved in the 
conspiracy are immune from suit." Id. at 512. As we set out in 
Norton v. Liddel. 620 F.2d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir. 1980), the 
plaintiff must demonstrate "the existence of a significant nexus 
or entanglement between the absolutely immune state official and 
the private party in relation to the steps taken by each to 
fulfill the objects of their conspiracy." 
III. Conclusion 
Since the court failed to consider whether the appellee 
conspired with the prosecutor to deny the appellant his 
constitutional rights, we find that it abused its discretion in 
dismissing the Section 1983 claim. Accordingly, we REMAND for the 
district court to reconsider its dismissal of the appellant's 
Section 1983 claims in light of this opinion. In all other 
respects the district court's order is AFFIRMED. 
Entered for the Court 
David M. Ebel 
Circuit Judge 
